Implement decryption logic and integrity verification
epic-contact-detail-and-edit-foundation-task-008 — Add AES-GCM decryption logic to field-encryption-utils using the retrieved org key. Implement HMAC integrity check on decrypted content to detect tampering. On successful decryption return plaintext; on integrity failure return a typed DecryptionError. All decryption must happen client-side — no plaintext traverses the network.
Acceptance Criteria
Technical Requirements
Execution Context
Tier 4 - 323 tasks
Can start after Tier 3 completes
Implementation Notes
Use Dart's pointycastle library for AES-GCM (GCMBlockCipher) and the crypto package for HMAC-SHA256. Store IV (12 bytes), ciphertext, and HMAC tag as separate base64 fields in the EncryptedFieldBlob model — do not concatenate them into a single opaque blob as this makes debugging impossible. Run decryption in a Dart compute() isolate to prevent UI jank on older devices; pass only serialisable data (base64 strings) across the isolate boundary — never pass key objects. Model the result as a sealed class hierarchy (DecryptionSuccess / DecryptionError) using Dart 3 sealed classes; this forces callers to handle the error case at compile time.
The HMAC check must run after decryption, not before — AES-GCM provides authenticated encryption natively, but the additional HMAC provides a secondary, independently auditable integrity layer as required for sensitive personal data (GDPR article 32). Never log the org key or plaintext — use structured logging with a sanitise() helper that redacts known secret field names.
Testing Requirements
Write unit tests using flutter_test covering: (1) successful AES-GCM decryption returns correct plaintext, (2) HMAC mismatch returns DecryptionError with INTEGRITY_VIOLATION, (3) corrupt ciphertext returns DecryptionError with DECRYPTION_FAILED, (4) null/empty input returns INVALID_INPUT without throwing, (5) unavailable org key returns KEY_UNAVAILABLE. Use known test vectors for AES-GCM to validate correctness. Mock the key store to return controlled keys. Verify no plaintext leaks into the DecryptionError fields.
Achieve 100% branch coverage on the result type handling. Integration test: encrypt a real contact field, persist to Supabase, fetch back, decrypt — assert round-trip fidelity.
Blindeforbundet's encryption key retrieval mechanism may not be finalised at implementation time, or session key availability via Supabase RLS may be inconsistent, causing decryption failures that expose masked placeholders to users and degrade the experience.
Mitigation & Contingency
Mitigation: Agree with Blindeforbundet on key storage and retrieval contract before implementation starts. Prototype key retrieval in a spike against the staging Supabase instance and validate the full decrypt/verify cycle with real test data before committing to the implementation.
Contingency: Implement a fallback that shows a 'field temporarily unavailable' state with a retry affordance. Log decryption failures server-side for audit. Escalate to Blindeforbundet stakeholders to unblock key management before the service tier epic begins.
NHF contacts may belong to up to 5 chapters, each governed by separate RLS policies. A coordinator's chapter scope may not cover all affiliations, causing partial profile reads or silent data omissions that are difficult to detect in tests.
Mitigation & Contingency
Mitigation: Map all RLS policy combinations for multi-chapter contacts early. Write integration tests that create contacts with 5 affiliations and query them from coordinators with varying chapter scopes. Use Supabase's RLS test utilities to verify row visibility per role.
Contingency: Add an explicit 'affiliation partially visible' state in the repository response model so the UI can communicate scope limitations to the coordinator rather than silently showing incomplete data.
Organisation-specific validation rules (e.g., NHF chapter limit, Blindeforbundet encrypted field edit flow) may expand in scope during implementation as edge cases are discovered, causing the validator to grow beyond the planned complexity.
Mitigation & Contingency
Mitigation: Define the complete validation rule set with product and org stakeholders before coding begins. Document each rule with its source organisation and acceptance test. Use a rule registry pattern so new rules can be added without modifying core validator logic.
Contingency: Timebox validator enhancements to 2 hours per additional rule. Defer non-blocking rules to a follow-on maintenance task rather than blocking the epic delivery.