Initialize default notification preferences on first login
epic-push-notification-delivery-foundation-task-012 — In NotificationPreferencesRepository, implement initializeDefaultPreferences(userId, orgId) that checks whether a preference row already exists and, if not, inserts default rows for all notification categories with enabled=true. Call this method from the post-authentication flow after role resolution completes. Ensure idempotency so repeated calls on the same user are safe. Use a Supabase upsert with ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING.
Acceptance Criteria
Technical Requirements
Execution Context
Tier 3 - 413 tasks
Can start after Tier 2 completes
Implementation Notes
Use supabase.from('notification_preferences').upsert(rows, onConflict: 'user_id,organization_id,category'). Build the rows list by iterating over a const NotificationCategory enum defined in constants — this ensures a single source of truth for category names. Wrap the call in a try/catch; on failure emit a PreferencesInitFailed event to a Riverpod StateNotifier so the UI can show a non-blocking snackbar. Do NOT await this call on the critical path of the auth redirect — fire-and-forget with error capture.
Add a composite unique index on (user_id, organization_id, category) if not already present in the migration.
Testing Requirements
Unit tests (flutter_test + mock Supabase client): (1) fresh user — verify all categories inserted with enabled=true; (2) existing user — verify upsert returns success with zero new rows; (3) network failure — verify error is swallowed and in-memory defaults applied; (4) multi-org user — verify separate rows created per orgId. Integration test: run full auth flow in test environment and assert preference rows exist in Supabase after login. Target 80% branch coverage on NotificationPreferencesRepository.
iOS only allows one system permission prompt per app install. If the rationale dialog timing or content is wrong the user may permanently deny permissions during onboarding, permanently blocking push delivery for that device with no recovery path short of manual system settings navigation.
Mitigation & Contingency
Mitigation: Design and user-test the rationale dialog content and trigger point (after onboarding value-demonstration step, not at first launch). Implement the settings-deep-link fallback in NotificationPermissionManager so the permission state screen always offers a path to system settings if denied.
Contingency: If denial rates are high in TestFlight testing, revise the rationale copy and trigger timing before production release. Ensure the in-app notification centre provides full value without push so denied users are not blocked from the feature.
FCM token rotation callbacks can fire at any time, including during app termination or network outage. If the token rotation is not persisted reliably the backend trigger service will dispatch to a stale token, resulting in silent notification failures that are hard to diagnose.
Mitigation & Contingency
Mitigation: Persist token rotation updates with a local queue that retries on next app foreground if network is unavailable. Use Supabase upsert by (user_id, device_id) to prevent duplicate token rows and ensure the latest token always wins.
Contingency: If token staleness is observed in production, add a token validity check on each app foreground and force a re-registration if the stored token does not match the FCM-reported current token.
Incorrect RLS policies on notification_preferences or fcm_tokens could expose one user's preferences or device tokens to another user, or could block the backend Edge Function service role from reading token lists needed for dispatch, silently dropping all notifications.
Mitigation & Contingency
Mitigation: Write explicit RLS policy tests using the Supabase test harness covering user-scoped read/write, service-role read for dispatch, and cross-user access denial. Review policies during code review with a security checklist.
Contingency: Maintain a rollback migration that reverts the RLS changes, and add an integration test in CI that asserts the service role can query all tokens and that a normal user JWT cannot access another user's token rows.